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715 South Calhoun Street Fort Wayne, Indiana 46802
https://mycourts.in.gov/arguments/default.aspx?&id=3123&view=detail&yr=&when=&page=1&court=APP&search=&direction=%20ASC&future=True&sort=&judge=&county=&admin=False&pageSize=20On February 28, 2019, Lindsey McGhee and Walter Duncan entered into a contract (“the Contract”) with Freedom Property Solutions, LLC (“Freedom Property”). The Contract is titled, “Land Installment Contract.” It identifies Freedom Property as a “Seller” and McGhee and Duncan as “Purchaser[s].” It identifies certain real property and its improvements, which included a residential structure, as the “Premises” that McGhee and Duncan were “buying” under the Contract.
The Contract states that the Premises were being sold “AS IS” and “without any representations or warranties of any kind” for a total purchase price of $49,900. McGhee and Duncan made a “down payment” of $2,495 at the time they executed the Contract; that amount was deducted from the total purchase price, and the remainder of the total purchase price was amortized over 180 months at an 8% interest rate (such that McGhee and Duncan owed $453 per month under the Contract). The Contract provided for a separate $78.33 monthly payment from McGhee and Duncan to Freedom Property for taxes and other assessments, which monthly amount was subject to change. And the Contract imposed the obligation of insuring the Premises on McGhee and Duncan.
The Contract also required McGhee and Duncan to “use, maintain[,] and occupy the Premises in accordance with any and all building and use restrictions applicable; to keep the Premises in accordance with all . . . regulations . . . ; to keep and maintain the Premises and the buildings” in no worse condition than they were upon execution or possession; and to not “diminish the value of Seller’s security” without consent. Similarly, the Contract provided that McGhee and Duncan were “solely responsible for . . . bringing the Premises . . . to a habitable condition within” four months of their execution of the Contract and to “properly maintain[] and us[e] the Premises” to avoid any code violations.
However, the Contract further stated that, if McGhee and Duncan “fail[ed] to perform” their obligations under the Contract, including if they missed any required payments, Freedom Property “may declare this Contract forfeited and void[] and may retain any payments made and all improvements to the Premises . . . .” In the event of a default, the Contract provided that Freedom Properties would provide McGhee and Duncan with thirty days to cure the default. If they failed to do so, Freedom Properties could then “evict or foreclose . . . to recover the Premises.” Freedom Property also reserved the right in the Contract to enter and inspect the Premises at any time. If McGhee and Duncan made all payments to Freedom Property as required over the life of the Contract, Freedom Property would then “execute and deliver . . . title to the Premises” to them.
Upon their execution of the Contract on February 28, 2019, McGhee and Duncan moved into the residence on the Premises with McGhee’s two minor children, J.M. and K.M. Three and one-half years later, on August 4, 2022, a house fire occurred at the residence while the two children were asleep. K.M. suffered severe injuries and died as a result two days later. There were no smoke detectors inside the house on the date of the fire or at any time after McGhee and Duncan had moved into the residence.
In October 2023, McGhee, on her own behalf as well as on behalf of her children, filed her complaint against Freedom Property, which Duncan later joined. In that complaint, they alleged that the Contract was a lease agreement, and, under Indiana landlord-tenant law, Freedom Property had negligently caused K.M.’s death and other injuries by not having working smoke detectors inside the residence and by not maintaining the Premises in a habitable condition. In response, Freedom Property argued that the Contract was a land-sale contract, and, thus, Freedom Property had no duty to ensure the safety or habitability of the Premises. The parties eventually cross-motioned for summary judgment on the dispositive question of whether the Contract was a lease or a land-sale contract.
The trial court entered summary judgment for McGhee and Duncan. The court then certified its summary-judgment order for interlocutory review, which we have accepted.
The scheduled panelists are Judge May, Judge Mathias, and Judge Foley.
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